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The Effect of a Loser-Pays Rule
on the Decisions of an American Litigant
Jaime Leigh Loos
ABSTRACT. Decisions made by litigants are often not beneficial to society. A rule
governing fee allocation in tort cases should encourage meritorious suits and discourage
frivolous suits. America is one of the only countries in the world that does not use a loserpays rule to assign legal costs. Employing a loser-pays rule could make the legal system
more efficient and more equitable. The effect of a loser-pays rule is analyzed with
economic theory and empirical evidence. Possible limitations of the rule are also
considered. A carefully applied system of loser-pays may positively affect the U.S. legal
system.

I. Introduction
In 1994 there were over 88 million tort cases filed in the U.S., or about
one case for every third person in the country [Shavell, 1997, 610n]. One
would expect the figure to be even more startling today, considering the
double-digit annual growth rate of litigation in recent years [Tillinghast,
2003, 1]. Most Americans feel that the number of lawsuits in the country
is excessive and that legal activity should be curbed. Fewer realize that
some areas of law are considered under-litigated because too few
incentives exist to encourage filing smaller meritorious claims [Shavell,
1999, para.2]. The challenge is to structure the legal system in such a
way that the choices made by individual litigants coincide with those
most beneficial to society. Because there are several externalities
associated with any legal decision, it is doubtful whether a system could
be developed to continuously equate an individual’s choice with the best
collective decision. Nevertheless, certain reforms should be made in an
attempt to reduce the harmful divergence between private and public
optimal use of the legal system.
Many reforms have been considered to alleviate the tort “crisis” in
America. One of the most commonly suggested reforms is a loser-pays
system of assigning legal costs. Under the current American system each
party bears his own legal fees regardless of the trial outcome. A loserpays rule allows the winning party to shift at least a portion of his legal
expenditures to the losing side. This paper will attempt to determine
whether adopting a loser-pays rule would be an effective method of tort
31
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reform. That is, could a loser-pays rule improve social welfare by making
the legal system more efficient and perhaps more just? The relative
efficacy of the rules can be judged based on the effect each has on
individual microeconomic decisions made during critical junctures in the
legal process, and on the predicted macroeconomic consequences arising
from individual decisions. An underlying component of equity or justice
should also be considered to determine the best overall system to allocate
court costs.
Often called the English or British rule, a system of loser-pays is
used by virtually every common law country in the world, except for the
U.S. Loser-pays is labeled the “English rule,” in contrast to the
“American rule,” because the two countries have very similar rules of
law, and because the general and legal cultures of England most closely
resemble those of the U.S. Although the difference in the legal systems
exists almost exclusively in the assignment of legal fees, the consequence
of the disparity is significant. The number of suits filed in 1992 per
100,000 people in England was 117.4, compared to 327.2 in the U.S
[Posner, 1997, 478]. In order to establish whether a specific feeallocation rule is responsible for promoting a particular level of litigation
in a country, it is necessary to understand how such a rule affects
individual decisions. But first, it is worthwhile to examine the magnitude
of the effect the legal system has on the U.S. economy.

II. Macroeconomic Implications
To understand the significance of choosing a proper fee-allocation rule as
a method of tort reform, one should have an idea of the total cost of
litigation in America. In 2002, the U.S. tort system cost the country $233
billion dollars, or $809 per citizen, which would have been equivalent to
a 5% tax on wages at the time [Tillinghast, 2003, 1]. Over the past 50
years, tort costs in the U.S. have increased more than one hundredfold,
while GDP has grown only by a factor of 35 [Tillinghast, 2003, 1]. In
2002, the growth rate of tort costs was 13.3%, compared to an economic
growth rate of 3.6% [Tillinghast, 2003, 2]. The Council of Economic
Advisors estimates that if the total burden of the tort system were to fall
on consumers, it would result in a 2% price increase on all goods and
services purchased in the U.S. [Kennedy, 2003, 247]. Measurable costs
of the legal system include attorney fees, court fees assigned to litigants
and those borne by society, and awards given by the judge or jury.
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The exact economic impact of the tort system, beyond monetary fees
and awards, is virtually impossible to calculate. Most of the actual costs
of the current system stem from the way court rulings influence behavior.
The mere threat of litigation manifests itself in price increases, product
modifications, and product cancellations. When a defendant is able to
pass on a jury verdict to his insurer, consumers face higher premiums on
their own policies, along with higher prices on the defendant’s products
and other similar goods. Certain industries are particularly plagued by the
cost of protecting themselves from litigation. The cost of liability
accounts for one-third of the price of an airplane, one-half of the price of
a football helmet, and over 95% of the price of a vaccine [Kennedy, 2003,
247]. The threat of liability also affects the country’s international
competitiveness. The comparatively higher rate of litigation in America
results in higher prices on American goods, which reduces the demand for
domestic products in international markets. The greater chance of being
sued in America also increases the perception of risk to overseas investors
and lowers the rate of return on American companies, both of which
dissuade foreign investment.

III. Microeconomic Analysis
A fee-shifting rule has the ability to change the macroeconomy by
influencing individual choices. There are three decisions made by the
litigant during the legal process that have the potential to substantially
affect the aggregate American economy: whether to file suit, whether to
settle or proceed to trial, and how much to spend during trial.
A. THE DECISION TO FILE SUIT
The primary goal of a rule governing fee allocation is to discourage
frivolous lawsuits and to encourage meritorious lawsuits. The reason to
deter all frivolous suits, in which the plaintiff’s case has no basis in law,
is self-evident. On the other hand, some may question the wisdom of
promoting a lawsuit, even one that is clearly meritorious. Most
economists agree that certain low-award suits must be encouraged so that
similar defendants have an incentive to avoid similar violations of proper
conduct. For instance, if an individual suffers harm as a result of a
company’s negligence, but decides not to file suit because the potential
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award is small, the company and others like it will have no incentive to
act differently to prevent similar injuries in the future.
Under the American rule, a plaintiff will file suit if his expected
judgment would be at least as large as his own legal costs. The
requirement is met when pA-X is greater than zero, where p is the
expected probability of success, A is the expected award, and X is the
cost of the plaintiff’s legal fees.
Under the English rule, a plaintiff will file suit if his expected
judgment would be at least as large as his expected legal costs, which are
equal to the total legal costs of both sides discounted by his probability
of losing. The requirement is met when pA – (1-p)(X+Y) is greater than
zero, where p, A, and X are the same as above, and Y is the defendant’s
legal fees.
It is useful to first establish the outcome of each rule assuming perfect
information, in which both sides’ expectations and the decision of the
court directly align with reality. In a perfect world, the American rule is
thought to deter all frivolous lawsuits because the litigant knows that he
has no chance of success and will bear his own legal fees. I question
whether the American rule adequately deters a frivolous suit, even in a
perfect world, when the plaintiff values revenge, in the form of inflicting
legal fees upon the defendant, more than he values his own legal costs.
Furthermore, simple reasoning shows that the American rule falls short
of encouraging all meritorious suits. The plaintiff has no incentive to file
suit if his own legal costs exceed his expected award, despite the
assurance that he will win.
Alternatively, the English rule is always able to arrive at the socially
optimal position under the assumption of perfect information. The
litigant would never file a frivolous lawsuit because he would necessarily
incur the costs of both sides’ legal fees when he loses, therefore inflicting
no punishment whatsoever on the defense. The English rule would also
encourage all meritorious suits because, even with a small award, the
plaintiff has an incentive to file suit knowing that he will recover all
personal legal expenditures along with his award.
It is more useful, but also more complicated, to compare the likely
outcomes of both rules in the real world of uncertainty. Ultimately, one
will find that neither rule is able to encourage all meritorious suits and
deter all frivolous suits when the litigants are unaware of their exact
probabilities of success and the courts are known to make mistakes. It is,
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therefore, primarily useful to evaluate each rule’s relative ability to arrive
at the socially optimal decision.
The supposition that the American rule is able to deter frivolous suits
does not hold true in the real world. Because the judicial outcome is
uncertain, the plaintiff may feel that he has some positive probability of
success. The plaintiff may file suit, although he has no legitimate basis
for his optimism, if he feels that some important factor may weigh in his
favor, such as finding an ignorant or prejudiced judge or jury. The
plaintiff may also file suit knowing he has no chance in court if he thinks
that he could coerce a settlement from the defendant. A defendant may
agree to pay off the plaintiff for harm the defendant did not cause if he
fears he will be incorrectly found liable, or if he expects high personal
court costs. The problem is made worse by the potential for a large
award. If an award is sufficiently large, say $100,000, it would only take
an expected win rate of 10% to make a marginal plaintiff indifferent
between filing the suit with a low probability of success and incurring
$10,000 of personal legal fees, and not filing the suit at all. In this case,
(0.1)($100,000) – ($10,000) = 0. Any increase in either the expected
award or perceived success rate will cause the marginal plaintiff to file
suit.
The English rule is also unable to deter all frivolous suits, but the
added cost of losing under a fee-shifting rule makes filing a low
probability suit much less attractive. For example, using the same figures
as above, if we include an equal amount of legal expenditures for the
defense, the plaintiff is no longer indifferent between filing suit and not
filing. It is common in economic analysis to assume proportionate legal
expenditures. As long as the costs for both sides are roughly
proportionate, the results are consistent. In this case, (0.1)($100,000) –
(1-0.1)($10,000 + $10,000) = -$8,000. The plaintiff predicts an expected
loss of $8,000 for filing the frivolous suit and thus will not file.
The American rule is not able to encourage all meritorious suits in the
real world, just as it was unable to do so in a perfect world. The problem
is compounded by uncertainty and the perceived probability that even a
credible case may fail. A plaintiff with a worthy case, in which the
defendant was responsible for real harm, may hesitate to file out of fear
that the judge or jury may inaccurately interpret the facts. The plaintiff
may be even more reluctant to file suit if his court costs are expected to
be high. For example, a litigant would be indifferent between filing a
case with a 95% probability of receiving a $50,000 award and incurring
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$47,500 in personal legal fees and not filing the suit at all. In this case,
(0.95)($50,000) – $47,500 = 0. A downward movement in the perceived
chance of success or expected award will cause the marginal plaintiff to
not file suit. A decision not to file can be detrimental to society because
it fails deter future harm and does not reimburse the victim for actual
harm.
Even under the English rule, a litigant may be discouraged from filing
a worthy suit when he is unsure of his exact probability of success.
Nonetheless, in cases where the suit is clearly valid and the plaintiff is
likely to win, he is more likely to file a suit under the English rule than
under the American rule. Under the English rule, when a plaintiff has
high odds of winning, he is able to discount the expected total costs by the
probability of losing, which is necessarily very low. If we use the same
numbers as above and include $47,500 as the legal costs of the defense,
we will see that the plaintiff has an incentive to file suit. In this case,
(0.95)($50,000) – (1-0.95)($47,500 + $47,500) = $42,750. The plaintiff
expects to gain $42,750, as it is very unlikely that he will be responsible
for paying the court costs and will therefore file the meritorious suit.
Several examples could be offered to demonstrate the outcomes of
both rules under different assumptions. Ultimately, one will find that by
holding the value of the award and the legal fees constant, it becomes
clear that there is a probability, p, above which a potential litigant is more
likely to file suit under the English rule, and below which, under the
American rule. When the plaintiff is relatively optimistic about winning,
his expected legal costs will be comparatively low under the English rule,
whereas he would have to bear his own costs with certainty under the
American rule. To solve for the critical probability of prevailing, one
must find where the expected total costs under the English rule,
discounted by the chance of losing, equals the cost of the plaintiff’s fee
under the American rule. Under the assumption of identical legal costs,
the critical probability is 50%. To illustrate, 0.5($1000+$1000) = $1000.
Although this is a very simplified example, the conclusion holds true that
the frequency of suit will be greater under the English rule only when the
plaintiff believes his likelihood of prevailing is above a “critical level”.
The economic analysis seems to demonstrate the superiority of the
English rule. Unlike the American rule, the English rule more effectively
deters frivolous suits while encouraging meritorious suits. It is important
to note, however, that the preceding analysis was conducted under the
assumption of risk-neutrality. The results of the analysis may change if
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one allows for a risk-averse plaintiff. The problem is not the deterrence
of frivolous suits. In fact, a plaintiff who is particularly fearful of losing
would be even less likely to risk incurring the cost of both sides’ fees
under the English rule. Unfortunately, a risk-averse plaintiff in a
meritorious case may also be discouraged from filing suit if he is overly
anxious about the possibility of paying the total court costs. Some critics
of the English rule worry that it would dissuade potential litigants in suits
concerning new, uncharted areas of law because of the increased penalty
of losing under the rule. Furthermore, the decision to file suit is only one
piece of the litigation puzzle. The effect of each rule on settlement rates
and trial expenditures are also important areas to consider in determining
the superiority of either rule.
B. THE DECISION TO SETTLE
Even if the plaintiff found it worthwhile to file suit, the question remains
whether he and the defendant will settle or proceed to trial. It is
important to remember that the total number of suits filed under the
English rule is predicted to be less than the number filed under the
American rule. A comparative economic analysis concerning settlement
rates is conditional upon the plaintiff having already brought suit and,
therefore, is not indicative of the overall trial rate of either rule. One may
assume that there will be a settlement only if there is a settlement figure
that both the plaintiff and defendant would prefer over going to trial
[Shavell, 1982, 63]. According to Coase’s Theorem, the two parties will
mutually bargain to save the total cost of proceeding to court if they can
agree on an acceptable settlement amount.
To compare the likelihood of trial under the English and American
rules, assume that the parties agree on the magnitude of the potential
judgment and that the individual legal costs are known, so that their
opinions can diverge only in respect to the probability of success at trial.
Under the American rule, there will be a trial if the plaintiff’s estimate of
the expected judgment exceeds the defendant’s estimate by at least the
sum of their known legal costs. Under the English rule, there will be a
trial if the plaintiff’s estimate of the expected judgment exceeds the
defendant’s estimate by at least the sum of their expected legal costs
[Shavell, 1982, 64]. Essentially, the parties under either rule are
motivated by what they perceive themselves as saving if they agree to
settle. Under the American rule, they hope to save their own legal costs.

38

Major Themes in Economics, Spring 2005

Under the English rule, they hope to save their expected legal costs, or
their perceived probability of losing multiplied by the costs of both
parties.
One will soon discover that the likelihood of trial will be greater
under the English rule, conditional on the suit having been filed in the
first place. The reason is that in order for litigation to be a possibility
under either rule, the plaintiff’s estimate of the expected judgment must
exceed that of the defendant. This means, under the present assumptions,
that the plaintiff’s estimate of his probability of winning exceeds the
defendant’s estimate. When a plaintiff is optimistic about his chances of
success under the English rule, he expects lower trial costs because he
will discount the total cost by his perceived small chance of losing. He
no longer has the same incentive to avoid trial as a plaintiff under the
American rule, who has no possibility of avoiding his own costs.
A numerical example can more clearly demonstrate this theory.
Assume that the legal costs of each side equal $1500, and the probable
judgment is $10,000. The plaintiff is optimistic and perceives a 75%
probability of success, whereas the defendant feels that his probability of
winning is 50%. Under the American rule, the plaintiff’s expected
judgment is $10,000(0.75) – $1500 = $6000. The defendant’s expected
judgment is $10,000(0.5) + $1500 = $6500. There is, therefore, a
possible settlement figure between $6000 and $6500 that would make
both parties better off than they expect to be at trial. Under the English
rule, the plaintiff’s expected judgment is $10,000(0.75) – (1-0.75)($3000)
= $6750. The defendant’s expected judgment is $10,000(0.5) + (10.5)($3000) = $6500. There is, therefore, no settlement range under the
English rule since the plaintiff expects to receive more at trial than the
defendant expects to lose.
Critics of the English rule often cite the potential for fewer
settlements as a reason not to adopt the rule in the U.S. It is important to
note, however, that the economic analysis focuses on the outcome of each
rule considering only a difference in the parties’ perceptions of success.
If the assumption that the plaintiff and the defendant agree about the
magnitude of the judgment is relaxed, the conclusion may be reversed.
When a plaintiff is pessimistic relative to the defendant about his
probability of success, but feels he will receive a much higher award
should he win than the defendant assumes, the English rule makes
settlement more likely [Shavell, 1982, 66]. In order for trial to be a
possibility under either rule when the plaintiff is pessimistic, the plaintiff
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must have a much higher expected award than the defendant. The effect
of his pessimism, however, increases the plaintiff’s expected legal costs
and his incentive to settle under the English rule. To illustrate, suppose
the defendant still believes his chance of prevailing is 50% and that the
probable award is $10,000. The plaintiff feels that his chance of winning
is only 35%, but that he will receive $24,000 if he wins. Under the
American rule, the plaintiff’s expected judgment is $24,000(0.35) –
$1500 = $6900. The defendant’s expected judgment remains $6500. The
American rule, therefore, no longer allows a negotiable settlement range.
Under the English rule, the plaintiff’s expected judgment is $24,000(0.35)
– (1-0.35)($3000) = $6450. The defendant’s expected judgment again
remains $6500. Under the new assumptions the English rule allows for
a settlement where the American rule does not. Furthermore, the analysis
again considers only a risk-neutral plaintiff. Allowing for a risk-averse
plaintiff increases the rate of settlement under the English rule, as the
litigants have higher total court costs at risk if they proceed to trial under
this rule. Some economists claim that the effect of risk-aversion is more
influential in determining settlement rates and actually overrides the fact
that plaintiffs under the English rule tend to be more confident in their
cases than their American counterparts [Shavell, 1982, 68]. In any event,
it is difficult to accurately determine the net effect each rule has on rates
of settlement.
C. TRIAL EXPENDITURES
It is well established that the English rule tends to cause litigants to
increase their legal expenditures [Hughes and Snyder, 1995, 227]. There
are two reasons for this. First, each party expects, with some probability,
to shift his legal costs to the other side. A litigant who is confident in his
ability to shift his fees to the other side is likely to spend more than he
would otherwise. Second, the English rule increases the stakes at trial by
the amount of the legal costs that are subject to fee-shifting. The stakes
of the trial are the difference between winning and losing. The American
rule reduces the reward of winning by holding the litigants responsible for
their own costs regardless of the outcome. The English system provides
more incentive to increase expenditures to ensure victory because a win
allows the litigant to shift at least a portion of his legal fees.
As a rule, a reduction in the benefit of winning relative to losing leads
to less vigorous battles in court [Baye, 2000, 19]. One may be tempted
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to conclude that the American system is a superior litigation system
because it reduces the stakes and therefore the incentive to spend
additional monies in court. The rule, however, only reduces legal
expenditures on a per-trial basis. There is an important tradeoff between
per-trial expenditures and the total number of cases brought to trial.
Although the American rule may provide comparatively less incentive to
spend great amounts to win, the rule also offers more incentive to file suit
initially because of the smaller amount at stake if one were to lose.
In summary, economic analysis suggests that fewer cases will be filed
under the English rule, and those that are will be of higher quality. The
analysis is somewhat ambiguous as to the rate of settlement under either
rule, and the English rule is found to increase expenditures at trial.

IV. Empirical Evidence
Although virtually every other common law country in the world uses the
English rule, critics may contend that results in foreign nations are
irrelevant to the American legal system. Some may argue that differing
market environments, economic conditions, social contexts, and other
external factors within the countries may influence the English rule’s
effectiveness. Fortunately, the English rule was applied in the U.S. to
medical malpractice suits in the state of Florida between 1980 and 1985.
This allows for a limited direct comparison between the two rules in
practice. Economists Hughes and Snyder studied 16,674 Florida cases,
some tried under the English rule and some filed before 1980 that were
tried under the American rule [Hughes and Snyder, 1995, 234]. Their
analysis provides insight into the actual effect the English rule may have
on litigant decisions.
One of the key findings of the study supports the prediction that the
quality of suits filed increases under the English rule. The average win
rate in the subset of American rule cases was 11.4%, while the average
for the English rule cases was 21.6% [Hughes and Snyder, 1995, 238].
The average settlement figures and judgment awards indicate that the
higher average win rate for cases under the English rule was likely due to
a decrease in frivolous suit filings, not an increase in smaller meritorious
suit filings. Regression results of the payment in cases settled outside of
court show that English rule settlements were higher by a factor of 30%
[Hughes and Snyder, 1995, 243]. Regression results considering all cases
tried in court indicate that awards given by judges were 117% higher
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under the English rule than those given out under the American rule
[Hughes and Snyder, 1995, 240]. Uncertainty remains as to whether the
higher plaintiff awards reflect only a better selection of plaintiffs, or if
they also signal a censoring of low-value cases due to the threat of highercost litigation. This is a critical distinction that the authors claimed they
would study further.
The results of the study also show that defensive expenditures rose
under the English rule. Critics are often concerned that an increase in
defensive outlays would severely disadvantage plaintiffs. This was not
found to be true as shown by the plaintiffs’ higher win rate and higher
average award under the English rule. The results suggest that greater
expenditures may influence a plaintiff’s filing decisions but do not govern
settlement or trial outcomes. The authors conclude that the higher
plaintiff win rate, judgments, and settlements imply that the plaintiffs use
a higher expected value threshold under the English rule [Hughes and
Snyder, 1995, 245]. They claim that the rule would ultimately serve to
limit the frequency of nuisance suits by encouraging plaintiffs to proceed
only with higher-quality claims, and that the rule would reduce incorrect
findings of liability because of the increase in defensive outlays. Perhaps
more importantly, the authors assert that their findings suggest the
English rule would reduce the overall probability of litigation in the
aggregate.

V. Addressing Criticisms
The English rule raises a few additional concerns beyond those already
discussed. As with any proposed change in American policy, the range
of criticism in this area is quite extensive. Some of the negative
responses have merit, while others seem to be somewhat irrational fears
based on misguided opinions or lack of information.
A small but vocal minority argues that the English rule is simply
unnecessary because a form of loser-pays already exists in America. In
truth, a rule allowing for the punishment of nuisance suits is on the books
in the form of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 11
requires an attorney to sign any paper before presenting it in court to
certify that, to the best of his knowledge, the document has not been
presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass or cause
unnecessary costs or delays in an existing case [Legal Information
Institute, section b]. In reality, Rule 11 is very infrequently applied, and
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the purpose of the rule is only to discourage inappropriate behavior, not
to compensate the victims of the wrongdoing. Actual monetary sanctions
are extremely rare and, when enforced, go to the court instead of to the
other party. Based on real world evidence, it seems that Rule 11 is not
able to effectively deter frivolous suits and, furthermore, the Rule makes
no attempt to encourage meritorious suits.
Many more people are concerned that the English rule would result
in an unjustly severe punishment for the loser of a very close battle. In
other words, critics feel that it is unfair to shift the entire burden of court
fees to the losing side when the case hinges on a few minor points. This
is an aspect of the equity component that I feel should be considered
when determining the appropriateness of a fee-allocation rule. English
courts have already addressed the concern of inequitable fee-shifting.
British fee-allocation is not necessarily all-or-nothing. The courts often
divide the fees according to how strong they perceive each litigant’s case
to be at the end of the trial. Therefore, fee-shifting depends not only on
which party prevails, but also on the margin by which they prevail
[Bebchuck and Chang, 1996, para. 7]. In very close cases, the parties
ultimately have fee responsibilities similar to their American
counterparts. In clearly one-sided cases the loser will bear the total of the
winner’s fees.
Another concern with the English rule is connected to the economic
analysis of litigant expenditures at trial. Critics claim that by increasing
the stakes, the rule would also increase the amount of time the parties
spend arguing in court. Again, the British system deals with this
possibility by allowing for flexibility in fee-shifting. Even a party with
a legitimate case risks sustaining an offsetting penalty if he tries to stretch
his case by adding less-plausible accusations. For example, if a plaintiff
claims that he suffers from a broken arm, chronically sore back, and
recurrent nightmares because of negligence on the part of the defendant,
but the judge finds that only his broken bone can be linked to actions of
the defendant, then he is thought to have lost part of his case. In this
situation, the plaintiff would recover the portion of his legal fees
associated with establishing the broken bone claim. He will lose the
money he spent in court trying to establish causality between the
defendant’s actions and his other supposed injuries. The English courts
similarly discourage the practice of making huge cash demands for
routine injuries. A plaintiff who claims millions of pounds in damages,
but is only able to prove thousands of pounds in injuries, is considered to
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have lost in part and is therefore responsible for at least some of his fees
[Olson, 1995, para. 15]. In America, the practices of including
unwarranted causes of action and claiming huge sums of damages
increase the length of stay in court by forcing defendants to spend extra
time fending off unreasonable claims and protecting themselves from
unnecessarily large demands. Although British litigants may have more
at stake in battle, they also have sufficient incentive to avoid this type of
frivolous activity.
Finally, some critics of the English rule believe that it is too effective
at reducing litigation, especially among lower income groups. They
worry that the English rule unfairly disadvantages potential plaintiffs and,
in doing so, diminishes basic access to justice [Olson, 1995, para.2]. It
is easy to envision a scenario in which powerful corporate defendants are
able to hire big name attorneys to defend their case and force weaker
plaintiffs to bear their exorbitant legal costs. An appropriate response is
to again look at the existing British system. In England, fee awards rarely
cover the full cost of litigation. They are instead based on a low set scale
depending on many factors, including the financial position of each party
[Bernstein, 1996, para. 43]. In this way, the rule is structured to not
unjustly disadvantage any particular group of litigants. Also, a defendant
in the British system is not awarded the fees for a first class attorney if a
third year law student could have adequately established his case. In fact,
overall, the English rule is more likely to help plaintiffs by discouraging
improper conduct by defendants. Powerful defendants are more likely to
be in a position to make costly delays in attempt to coerce a settlement.
They have an incentive to avoid doing so under the English rule because
delays made against worthy claims ultimately cost them more money by
adding to the time and money spent in court by both sides [Bernstein,
1996, para. 45]. Furthermore, one should also consider that a loser-pays
rule is used by social democracies such as Sweden and Denmark,
countries that would undoubtedly abolish a rule that unjustly
disadvantaged the poor [Olsen, 1995, para. 6].

VI. Conclusion
The English rule is shown by theory, and proven by practice, to reduce
the overall amount of litigation. A fee-shifting rule should discourage
frivolous suits and encourage meritorious suits. By increasing the amount
at stake, the English rule is far more successful at decreasing frivolous
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lawsuits than is the American rule. The innate increased risk under the
English rule may also serve to discourage risk-averse plaintiffs with
meritorious claims. It may be that one is forced to choose between the
lesser of two evils. Under the American rule, neither valid nor invalid
claims are discouraged by fee-allocation. Evidence shows that litigants
naturally think too highly of their cases; the English rule pushes them to
judge their prospects more realistically. If the English rule ultimately
caused litigation on the whole to decline, would the country really be any
worse off? The legal system is not the most efficient method to solve
conflicts between individuals. Perhaps it would not be such a poor
decision to force potential litigants to think twice before they file a suit.
Finally, despite the concern of discouraging plaintiffs, the English
rule is considered by many to be more efficient and ethically superior.
Most people would agree that defendants deserve compensation for the
expense of defeating an unfounded claim. Likewise, a plaintiff with a
legitimate claim should be able to recover his full loss, including the legal
fees paid to defeat the guilty defendant. The bottom line is that nowhere
else in the world are there as many resources invested in the legal system
as in the U.S., and everywhere else in the world a loser-pays system is
used. Foreign politicians and scholars the world over know that the
American system exists, and consciously choose to reject it. Perhaps it
is time that our country does the same.
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